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Advancements in the digital domain, for example, in blockchain technology, big
data, and machine learning, are increasingly shaping the lives of individuals, groups,
organizations, and societies. These developments call for effective governance to
protect the basic interests and needs of these actors. Simultaneously, the very nature of
governance is also changing. Policy-making is increasingly moving away from top-down
governance by the state toward more horizontal modes of governance. This paper
reviews the literature on governance theory in order to conceptualize governance as
a mode of decentralized, networked regulation. We argue that the current dominant
modes of governance are inadequate in understanding governance in the digital
domain and are poorly equipped to conceptualize novel forms of governance such
as decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs). Therefore, this study proposes a
new mode of governance based on the regulation of new power relationships between
the state and actors in the digital domain. This model further explores the role that
blockchain technology can play in what we term decentralized network governance.
Keywords: blockchain, governance, networks, decentralized autonomous organizations, social network analysis
INTRODUCTION
Innovations in the digital domain are increasingly shaping the daily processes and interactions
of individuals, educational institutions, companies, and governmental organizations. However,
the theoretical frameworks of governance that are being employed concerning these have not
advanced at the same pace, and fall behind in terms of regulating new technologies and their societal
impact. Blockchain is one of these new technologies and is widely seen as a “swiss multi-tool” that
can provide solutions for many emergent problem areas such as digital identity, data ownership,
privacy, and even future decentralized decision-making (see section Mode 3 – Decentralized
Network Governance and Blockchain Technology on DAOs). In this paper, we tie together the
literature on governance and social network theory in order to develop a novel conception of
governance. We argue that this novel conception is better at accommodating new and increasingly
dominant forms of technological governance such as through blockchain technology. Moreover,
we propose that it addresses governance challenges caused by blockchain technology in a more
effective way. The conception of decentralized network governance relies on social network theory.
The manner in which societies are and can be effectively governed has changed. Because of the
pressures of globalization, functional differentiation, and technological specialization, governance
processes and mechanisms have become increasingly decentered, horizontal, and, ultimately,
Frontiers in Blockchain | www.frontiersin.org 1 March 2020 | Volume 3 | Article 12
fbloc-03-00012 March 23, 2020 Time: 20:7 # 2
Zwitter and Hazenberg Decentralized Network Governance
networked (Rhodes, 1996, 1997; Kooiman, 2003; Van Kersbergen
and Van Waarden, 2004; Bevir, 2010, p. 1–93). Policy-making no
longer relies primarily on the exerted power of a single actor,
which has traditionally been the state. Instead, interactions and
societies are becoming increasingly governed by networks that
comprise a diverse set of public and private actors. It has also been
acknowledged that the digital era is increasingly fragmenting
the playing field between governance actors (Murray, 2011).
These changes necessitate an updated conceptualization of what
governance is, as well as a consideration of what extent new
technologies like blockchain technology [and also digital ledger
technology (DLT)] can contribute to effective and legitimate
governance mechanisms.
The aim of this study is to merge the literature on governance
with social network theory, in order to conceptualize a new
approach to governance: decentralized network governance.
Within the governance literature, policy-making is becoming
increasingly conceptualized in terms of different modes
of governance. These range from Westphalian command-
and-control governance to decentered, horizontal, and
self-referential modes of governance. In order to envision
governance effectuated by digital networks in general and by
blockchain technology specifically, we turned to network theory.
This theory offers an appropriate concept of societal power
in a networked system, of which distributed ledgers and the
decentralized nature of blockchain technology are an example.
Whereas traditional and new modes of governance rely on
the identity and roles of specific actors, blockchain technology
requires a re-appreciation of the powers exerted by different
actors. In this study, we used Manuel Castells’s conception of
network power in order to analyze new power relationships
(Castells, 2000, 2011). Traditional modes of governance fail to
appreciate changes in power relationships that result from the
emergence of new actors, practices, and relationships. We argue,
however, that such consideration is essential for constructing
governance in the digital domain.
This paper consists of four sections. In the first section, the
terms datafication and blockchain technology are introduced.
In the second section, governance literature is reviewed and
dominant modes of governance are conceptualized. In the
third section, arguments are put forward concerning why these
modes of governance are inadequate in terms of effectively
governing the quasi-theoretical conceptions introduced by DLT
and blockchain technology. The fourth section offers the first
methodological clues for the analysis of network governance,
based on social network analysis. These methods will allow
for better decisions to be made regarding how to design and
disseminate power relationships into technological solutions,
which require oversight and regulation.
DATAFICATION AND BLOCKCHAIN
TECHNOLOGY
The creation, collection, dissemination, and distribution of all
sorts of information in the digital domain rely no longer
solely on social processes but increasingly on technology. An
algorithm determines the updates you see on Facebook, press
agencies rely on data analysis to assess the newsworthiness of
information, and social networking sites and blogs are digitally
scraped for information to target advertisements at individuals
(Goodman, 2015). Blockchain technology is promising to reform
digital currency, in order to improve logistics and help manage
digital identity in a decentralized and trustless manner (Zwitter
and Boisse-Despiaux, 2018). These algorithms are primarily
developed and employed by private actors.
Information is crucial for social coordination, i.e., for
governance, and digital data are the modern embodiment of
information. This means that the conditions of the digital
domain affect governance substantially. Artificial intelligence
(AI) and blockchain technology are among the most prominent
exemplifications of this phenomenon. More and more of our
social interactions are being shaped by these technologies. The
political and economic worlds are also becoming increasingly
structured and regulated by the effects of AI and DLT, increased
connectivity, and the services surrounding them. Researchers
and professionals alike are prophesizing a data revolution
that is as equal in impact and disruptive in force as the
industrial revolution.
The potential uses and value of AI and DLT are indeterminate
and potentially limitless. This indeterminacy is arguably one
of the driving forces behind the fast pace of innovation in
these fields. Academics, data analysts, and corporations are
in the process of finding value in data and its decentralized
management. They are also looking into ways that data sets can
be operationalized and linked and are trying to determine what
can be learnt from such analyses (Manyika et al., 2011; Provost
and Fawcett, 2013; Chandler, 2015; Metcalf and Crawford, 2016).
Blockchain technology and DLT can be defined as
decentralized and trustless ledgers, recording transactions across
a peer-to-peer network. These features create the potential to
provide transparency as well as accountability. Such technologies
could impact not only the financial sector (e.g., Bitcoin, Libra)
but also diverse fields such as supply chain management, digital
identity, smart contracts, voting (e.g., liquid democracy), health
records, water management, and much more.
To summarize this in a simplified manner, a blockchain is
a decentralized database that stores a registry of assets and
transactions across a peer-to-peer network. The “asset” may
not only be money or transactional information, but also
information regarding ownership, contracts, goods, and any
other information (Warburg, 2016). A blockchain does not
duplicate the value that is transferred, like other peer-to-peer
networks, but instead, it registers that a value has been transferred
from one actor to another. Moreover, DLT does not require any
central control system, and it stores the transaction history in
blocks of data that are cryptographically locked together. As it
is replicated on every node in the blockchain network, it becomes
an immutable and transparent historical record of all transactions
(Balva, 2017).
Blockchain is based on a consensus mechanism. This
mechanism basically relies on “hashing” and a type of “proof,”
e.g., “proof of work,” “proof of stake,” and other proofs. Hashing
is the process of creating a digital fingerprint of any sort of
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information shared in the transaction. The hash is a way of
verifying the authenticity of the transaction. This allows users to
identify whether data have been tampered with.
The technical specifications of DLT systems are becoming
increasingly varied in nature. This shows that often-highlighted
features of blockchain technologies, such as immutability,
transparency, and trustlessness, are in fact design features rather
than sine qua non-conditions (Zwitter and Boisse-Despiaux,
2018). However, one can say that blockchain is a technology that
lowers the uncertainty regarding transactions between parties
that do not otherwise share trust. The idea of a “trustless”
technology means that DLT, by nature of a validated ledger shared
across all peers, reduces the uncertainty of not having recourse
if something goes wrong with a transaction. Since DLT allows
the tracing of every transaction, from the beginning until it is
validated and added to the blockchain (or similarly structured
ledgers), users can verify whether an error has happened, and also
where the error has occurred.
A particularly interesting development that the emergence
of blockchain technology has brought with it is the concept
of DAOs (decentralized autonomous organizations). Blockchain
technology and Bitcoin have been developed to make traditional
financial governance mechanisms obsolete, as its developer
Satoshi Nakamoto (mysteriously or pseudonymously named)
envisioned (Nakamoto, 2008). The technology was designed
with a specific governance model in mind, and this becomes
more visible when reviewing the discourse on DAOs (Chohan,
2017). DAOs can be defined as “non-hierarchical organizations
that perform and record routine tasks on a peer-to-peer,
cryptographically secure, public network, and rely on the
voluntary contributions of their internal stakeholders to operate,
manage, and evolve the organization through a democratic
consultation process” (Hsieh et al., 2018). The DAO thereby has
two governance components. The first is the internal governance
component, which is characterized by non-hierarchical modes
of governance and has quasi-democratic features. These features
are quasi-democratic rather than democratic because there is no
guarantee of the principle “one person, one vote.” For example,
an actor can accumulate more votes than others, thus tipping
voting balance in its favor. Dependent on its design, the weight of
voting rights can be based on several different parameters. Within
the DAO, voting weight can be dependent on the ownership
of tokens, the weight can be capped at certain levels, etc.
(Quiniou, 2019, p. 84). The external governance component is
the reliance on clusters of servers and individual nodes for the
functioning of the network and decision-making. In essence,
actors can exert undue influence on decision-making, and in a
stronger way than other actors, if they control more nodes and
server capacity. Furthermore, developers themselves can offer
code upgrades through open participation and self-selection, and
miners can vote on protocol changes based on computing power
(Hsieh et al., 2018).
From a policy-making perspective, big data analytics, AI, and
DLT have drastically changed the core concepts of governance.
Two key effects have been observed:
Actors and roles: New actors are appearing, both on the
national and international stage. Moreover, the roles and
relationships that actors have developed between each other are
changing (Zwitter, 2015). New actors who are bridging the digital
with the physical world are emerging as increasingly powerful
players on both the national and international stage. These are
not just the big corporations, such as Google, Facebook, and
BuzzMetrics, which are dominant in collecting and analyzing
big data, but also smaller interest groups who are gaining
traction through the quasi-democratizing effect of blockchain
technology and the equalizing effect of digital communication.
Hacking collectives such as Anonymous and LulzSec are being
recognized as powerful players not to be ignored. Furthermore,
the cyber domain has established new and changing roles
of different governance actors. Big data generators, collectors,
utilizers, blockchain miners, server providers, etc., are new
roles that are shaping the relationships between actors. A good
example of the changing effect that this has had on relationships
between actors is “the paradox of individuality in big data”
(Richards and King, 2013). Although the individual plays a
relatively insignificant role within the larger pool of data, i.e.,
as a generator and utilizer of data and authenticator in the
blockchain, the individual can potentially become powerful.
Examples of this power (of the individual as the utilizer of
technology) are the numerous hacks that have affected the
blockchain community, e.g., the Mt. Gox hacks, BitStamp hack,
Bitcoinica hacks, etc.
Power relations: These new actors and changing roles are
constituting new and changing power relationships. In particular,
actors such as tech corporations and organizations involved in
blockchain technology, like the Ethereum or IOTA networks,
have become increasingly powerful because ownership is in
the hands of those who develop the means, collect the data,
and repurpose the tools (Richards and King, 2013, p. 44).
In the domain of big data, collectors (which also include
many state agencies) determine what is collected and stored,
and for what period of time. Big data utilizers, who are
predominantly private corporations, operationalize data by
defining and re-defining it for purposeful analysis. Small groups
and individuals operating as hacktivists, cyber criminals, and
cyber terrorists can challenge the power of corporations and
states. The power relationships between these actors influence
social coordination. These are also no longer confined to
national jurisdictions because the digital realm spans the
entire globe. The source of power thereby changes1. As we
will see below, the different kinds of relationships (nodal
relationships between actors) can become very relevant in the
exercising of power.
The shift in power relationships effectuated by the digital
transformation of big data, blockchain technology, and AI
has been tremendous. Technologies provided by private
corporations, and the data bought from large data collectors,
are being increasingly replied upon by many sectors such
as intelligence agencies, the public and private banking
system, and political parties. In effect, the legal, economic,
1Power is here conceived as relational (Dahl, 1957). Conceived as a relation, power
exists in coordination and the ability of an actor to command that coordination.
A single actor cannot be powerful in and of itself, it is in the ability to command
others that she has power.
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political, criminal, and military domains have undergone
tremendous change due to the digitalization of the world. As
we will show, traditional modes of law and governance are
doing little to conceptualize, control, and coordinate these
shifts in power.
In general, these emergent technologies, and blockchain
technology in particular, are already tacitly or explicitly
imposing their own governance norms, when seen from the
perspective of Lessig’s “Code is Law” (Lessig, 2000). However,
closer investigation is required in order to ascertain whether
these imposed norms of governance also need regulation
and governance themselves. There is a need to strike a
balance between the new power distributions and the tacit
governance norms and structures imposed by technology, vis-à-
vis the existent normative framework and governance structure
surrounding our democratic principles. However, the changing
roles of governance actors and, thereby, the available mechanisms
of governance require reconceptualization. This is because, for
instance, legal norms are notoriously lagging behind in relation to
the pace of technical innovations, but also because the potential
illegitimate uses of big data pose a great threat to fundamental
rights and require some form of regulation and/or oversight.
Public actors, traditionally conceived as protectors of public
interest, lack the capabilities to effectively govern the spaces
created by many technological innovations. Moreover, public
actors have been subject to critique for the widespread collection
of the data of individuals, and the leaks of such data as well.
The next section will explore the concept of governance and
its dominant modes.
MODES OF GOVERNANCE
The digital domain requires regulation and governance in order
to establish a more legitimate, and ultimately productive, balance
of power. This raises the question of what the best way to conceive
and conceptualize such norms and rules is. In this study, we have
taken a broad perspective of governance, avoiding bias toward
specific modes of governance.
Governance itself is an elusive concept, highly complex and
contested in literature (Kooiman, 2003; Van Kersbergen and Van
Waarden, 2004; Levi-Faur, 2012; Colombi-Ciacchi, 2014). In our
study, we use a unifying conception of governance based on
Levi-Faur (2012). Levi-Faur (2012, p. 7–8) defines governance
as “signifier of change” in policy-making. By signifying different
changes in policy-making, governance opens up “new ways,
new concepts, and new issues for research” (Levi-Faur, 2012,
p. 7–8). This conception of governance as a signifier of change
offers a comprehensive perspective on policy-making as subject
to “continuous change of patterns of interaction and relations
among actors” (Sand, 2004).
Governance is often depicted by distinguishing between “old”
and “new” governance (Rhodes, 1996, 1997; Mayntz, 2003; Bevir,
2010; Lobel, 2012). “Old” refers to hierarchical structures, mostly
of state institutions. “New” refers to the emergence of more
horizontal modes of policy-making, which have arisen due to
the pressures of globalization and the functional differentiation
of sectors of society. However, given that neither old nor new
types exclude each other, they often co-exist in practice and a clear
temporal distinction between them cannot be located. We refer to
these types of governance as Mode 1 and Mode 2 governance. The
current assessment focuses on two aspects of Mode 1 and Mode 2
governance: roles and power relationships. Governance roles are
understood as the ability to participate in policy-making at any
stage. Power relationships refer to the relative power that an actor,
or a certain role, has over other actors within policy-making and
its enforcement. Within different modes of governance, different
aspects of power relationships are deemed relevant. A useful
analogy of this is the power that a policeman has standing at
an intersection commanding traffic: power can be derived from
his uniform, the perception of the drivers, or of him blocking
the road (Dahl, 1957). Similarly, modes of governance regulate
or coordinate different aspects of power relationships based on
what is deemed the relevant aspect of power.
Mode 1 Governance
Mode 1 governance, or “old” governance in the literature,
refers to governance carried out primarily via the hierarchical
command-and-control structures of the state and other
public hierarchies (see Figure 1). This means that it relies
on authoritative institutions to make policies through the
enforcement of hard law. Rooted in Westphalian notions of
nation-states, this mode of governance is often legitimized
through justificatory strategies resting on public sovereignty
and public input in political decision-making (Scharpf,
1999). Therefore, Mode 1 governance is inherently political
and institutional.
FIGURE 1 | Hierarchical command-and-control policy-making via the state.
Within Mode 1, the state is sovereign and legitimate in commanding and
controlling societal actors (both public and private; among private actors, for
example, social groups and small and medium enterprises, SMEs). The
identity of actors is perceived as the relevant aspect of power. Power
relationships are vertical because they base themselves on the identity of the
state as sovereign and legitimate.
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Furthermore, this mode of governance can be interpreted
as identity-based. Within identity-based governance, roles are
assigned to and/or performed by actors based on who these
actors are, i.e., their identity. For example, Mode 1 governance
locates the authority to perform tasks of policy-making, or the
delegation thereof, with state organs because of who the state
is. This means that the state’s identity is seen as being an
authoritative and legitimate public body, acting as sovereign over
a territory and as the source of law and policy. Intermediary
institutions perform governance roles only through delegated
authority by the state.
Given the relative clarity of governance structures within
Mode 1, the relevant aspects of power relations are equally clear.
The authority to make, implement, and enforce policies lies with
the state or those that it delegates to do so. Power is static
because authority is permanently assigned to an actor, based
on its identity. The relevant aspect of a power relationship is
thus the identity of the actor capable of commanding others.
Moreover, power relationships are governed via structured
governance mechanisms, by predominantly assigning rights to
weaker parties and duties to stronger parties. The static nature
of power and structured conception of power relationships are
explained by the fact that relationships between individuals,
organizations, societal actors, corporations, etc. are mediated
and governed via the state as the dominant hierarchical
authority in policy-making. A good example of this is the
relationship between human rights and the duty of the state
to protect them.
Mode 2 Governance
Mode 2 governance, or “new” governance, contrasts with
these distinct Westphalian structures of policy-making. It
represents a move away from the vertical command-and-
control structures of the state toward more horizontal modes
of policy-making (see Figure 2). This approach creates a more
level playing field between societal actors, both private and
public. Authority is not necessarily acquired by identity but
rather through performance, knowledge, and expertise. Public–
private partnerships, policy networks, and private governance
all reflect the nature of a world in which the state is
arguably no longer the central governing authority (Rhodes,
1997; Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden, 2004). Examples of
Mode 2 governance are diverse, but include public–private
partnerships working toward the achievement of policy goals
that private sector agents are trying to realize more effectively
and efficiently through self-regulation. Other examples of areas
FIGURE 2 | Horizontal policy-making in which societal actors have greater independence in commanding their spheres of influence and/or making and implementing
policies. Coinciding with this, the state takes on a role of “steering” rather than “rowing.” The state regulates societal actors by incorporating them into the
policy-making process. The role they can play therefore becomes the relevant aspect of power, and the power relationships become the relevant focus of
governance. Oversight is performed by non-majoritarian institutions such as central banks that guard the boundaries set by the state.
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where Mode 2 governance mechanisms apply are soft law,
negotiation, compromise, competition, codes of conduct, and
other corporate sectoral agreements on standards of production
or quality. As such, Mode 2 governance changes the roles and
power relationships of and between actors involved in policy-
making or subject to these policies. While not being necessarily
unified, different forms of Mode 2 governance are role-based
in the distribution of governance tasks, as opposed to identity-
based.
Role-based governance implies that governance tasks and
mechanisms are assigned to and/or performed by actors
because of the role they can perform, to achieve a desired
policy goal within a specific domain. Policy goals and
corresponding benchmarks become prominent tools in steering
policy-making in specific directions. For instance, a public
institution sets goals in a specific policy domain and delegates
the achievement thereof to private or corporate actors. These
actors are perceived as being more capable of efficiently
and expertly delivering the desired goal in this domain. In
other domains, the roles of the same private and corporate
actors might be completely different. This explains why Mode
2 is not identity but role-based, as the examples below
illustrate:
It should be noted that the distinction between Modes
1 and 2 governance is not always clear in practice. Many
hybrid forms exist that borrow elements from both
modes. The most prominent is multi-level governance,
predominantly employed to describe policy-making
within the European Union. It relies on both Mode
1, i.e., hierarchical commands from a public authority,
and Mode 2, policy networks and the involvement
of private actors (Mayntz, 1998). Mode 1 governance
is increasingly dismantled at the level of the state,
while simultaneously reconstructed at the regional and
international level in combination with Mode 2 governance
(Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden, 2004).
With a view to Mode 2 governance, one can see that actors
who are frequently engaged in the field of blockchain and
DLT take on a variety of different roles. An interesting case
that illustrates this is the call for regulation of initial coin
offerings (ICOs) and similar crypto-securities. These ICOs can
be described as cryptographically secured tokens that represent
a token owner’s bundle of rights and obligations vis-à-vis a
token provider. They are issued by a token provider and
registered on the blockchain as a source of income for their
projects. In the last few years, such ICOs have come under
increasing public scrutiny as concerning their role as financial
securities under US and EU regulations. There have also been
frequent fraudulent uses of ICOs, and these have become a
contested issue in policy and academic debates (Hacker and
Thomale, 2018). In terms of our typology, this shifted the
debate around ICOs from being an unregulated space into the
realm of Mode 2 governance, with governance ranging from
moderate self-regulation to non-autonomous self-governance. It
remains to be seen whether states deem it necessary to enforce





Constructing the governance of the digital domain requires
conceptualizing the relevant aspects of power relationships
within this domain vis-à-vis Mode 1 and 2 governance.
It is not surprising that the digital domain, and especially
blockchain technology, cannot be effectively governed through
either mode of governance. This is firstly because the emergent
new roles and power relationships in the digital domain are
neither hierarchical nor horizontal. Instead, they are fluid,
with different roles and power relationships often residing in
a single, anonymous, actor. Secondly, blockchain technology
enables trustlessness, whereas trust is fundamental to the
functioning of both Mode 1 and 2 governance. This section
will address the first consequence briefly, before providing
the stepping stones for the conceptualization of decentralized
network governance (Mode 3).
Modes of governance rely on conceptions of the relevant
aspects of power relationships to be governed. In relation to
the digital domain and blockchain in particular, power must
be conceptualized as fluid, as different actors perform different
governance roles within different contexts. Also, there are times
when the networks through which roles are distributed operate
as governance actors themselves. As identities and roles are no
longer central to the exertion of power in social coordination,
their place has been taken by new forms of power and hence
require new forms of governance. Castells’s writing on network
power (mentioned previously) notes that there are four forms
of power specifically related to networks: networking power,
network power, networked power, and network-making power.
We can see that these relate closely to the digital domain and
blockchain technology (Castells, 2011)3:
• Networking power: the power that actors and organizations
have that constitutes the core of the network. This power
pertains to the ability to include and exclude others, and
thereby controls the makeup of the network.
2 Within governance literature, Mode 2 governance is sometimes depicted as
“network governance.” Within this strain of governance literature, the “network”
is employed primarily as metaphor to exemplify the increasingly horizontal
structures of Mode 2 governance and mechanisms of compromise and negotiation.
We refer to decentralized network governance as the governance of a network
(e.g., a blockchain network) through a network (the multiplicity of actors that
exert power in continuously changing roles and relationships). Moreover, literature
that describes Mode 2 governance as “network governance” often focuses on the
relationships and mechanisms of coordination within institutions, for instance,
regulatory agencies or public administrations. The present conceptualization does
not confine itself to such a limitation. See Klijn (2008); Koppenjan and Klijn (2004),
and Lewis (2011).
3Manuel Castells conceptualizes networked power as the dominant form of power
exerted within modern networked societies. This is not the time or place to argue
for or against this conceptualization of societal powers that structure modern
societies. We employ these forms of network power as they directly relate to
new powers that emerge within networks. The cyber domain is thus conceived
as network, and its most prominent exemplifications are literally so without
necessarily conceiving of societies themselves as networks.
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• Network power: the power that results from the standards
required to coordinate interactions. This primarily
concerns the imposition of rules within a network.
• Networked power: the power that actors have over one
another within a network. This power mimics traditional
conceptions of power but the way in which it is exerted
differs per network.
• Network-making power: the power of an actor or
organization to constitute or re-program a network
according to its values and specific interests.
The employment of traditional modes of governance threatens
to undermine the benefits of technological innovations such
as blockchain and DLT. In particular, overregulation or the
application of inadequate mechanisms often reduces the potential
benefits of digital technologies. Consequently, this might
produce more negative outcomes than positive ones, seeing
as a mismatch between regulations and intended governance
norms of technological solutions could produce the appearance
of regulation without actually having adequate substance.
Alternatively, overregulation might be obsolete when trust is not
an issue, as is the case with blockchain-enforced governance.
The hierarchical governance of big data actors and states
can either miss their targets, because the digital realm is not
necessarily confined to territories, or tamper with innovations
that might benefit societies. It is, for instance, commonly
accepted that “code changes quickly, user adoption more slowly,
legal contracting and judicial adaptation to new technologies
slower yet, and regulations through legislation slowest of all”
(Brown and Marsden, 2013, p. xv). Single actor solutions
should therefore be rejected. Mode 2 governance can undermine
the potential benefits of blockchain-based governance as its
distribution of governance responsibilities cannot, as we have
seen, be readily applied to governance structures established by
blockchain technology. The integration of actors into governance
mechanisms, based on their ability to achieve policy outcomes,
runs the risk of privatizing oversight into the hands of those
with the most power.
We propose a novel network approach to governance that
is more tailored to the decentralized nature of governance
structures, and which can generally be found in blockchain
solutions and DAOs more specifically. Our approach of
decentralized network governance seeks to distribute governing
tasks according to capability and exerted power, on a fluid basis.
This implies that governance tasks are distributed neither on
the basis of the identity of actors nor on the basis of the role
they can perform in the governance process. Given that different
actors perform multiple roles within blockchain structures, often
simultaneously, the relational nature of power is fundamental in
this conception of governance. Within a governance network, a
relational conception of power necessitates fluidity in governance
tasks. The distribution of power becomes variable and dynamic
dependent on the specific relation between two or more actors
(see Figure 3).
Within decentralized network governance, roles vary
according to the nature of the network and the relations within
it. This requires that the distribution of governance tasks,
FIGURE 3 | Within the digital domain, and more specifically the domain of
digital network providers, the state has limited powers and new actors
emerge. These new actors command others through network-making and
networked power, in a multitude of continuously changing relationships.
Individual ownership of governance is limited. Governance over and within this
network is thereby differentiated. This problematizes that power is dispersed
throughout the network and is dependent on clusters/alliances of actors that
can change per topic.
rights, and obligations are sensitive to relationships of power
between actors. Governance mechanisms must be flexible.
Moreover, as new aspects of power relationships become
relevant in blockchain-based solutions, such as those concerning
server providers, miners, etc., governance mechanisms should
address these. Whereas traditional modes of governance
assume that power resides in identities or roles, decentralized
network governance perceives power as residing in specific
and changing relationships. Power can thus reside in every
actor from individuals, corporations, or the state, depending
on the relationship between these actors requiring governance.
In different roles and relationships, multiple actors can possess
each of the novel network powers. Regarding the concept of
fluid power, and differing from other governance modes where
roles are defined a priori, Mode 3 governance tacitly implies
power through being an actor in a networked environment.
This form power is a function of connectivity. In social network
analysis, this kind of power is referred to as centrality of an
actor in the network. Power in the form of connections allows
actors to define their own role by choosing alliances dependent
on the issues that are at stake. The example of voting behavior
regarding finding consensus around hard forks is a case in point.
By choosing alliances, networked actors assume governance
functions within the network.
In order to illustrate this, we can take DAOs as an example. To
qualify as a DAO, organizational governance on the blockchain
needs to implement voting rights that determine the autonomous
execution of smart contracts when certain conditions have been
met, e.g., absolute majority or agreement of certain stakeholders
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and certain external conditions. “[The] DAO as an entity acts
independently and cannot be influenced by external forces. The
organization and its open-source code are fully transparent and
therefore incorruptible. The functionalities and program rules are
written in code and maintained on the blockchain” (Kondova and
Barba, 2019). Any actor in the blockchain can submit a proposal
that will be automatically executed if the consensus mechanism is
triggered by the actors in the blockchain network. This ensures
that all actors are voters and proposal-submitters at the same
time: a clear case for networked power. At the same time, “The
DAO” project in 2016 at ETH-Zurich illustrated that network
power – the power over a network for standard setting – can
act as a last resort fail-safe. In this case, the $250 million raised
through the Ethereum network upon the launch of the project
were stolen, but then through the fail-safe of the hard fork, they
were recovered. DuPont elaborates on this as follows:
However, shortly after the minimum 2-week “debating” period, on
June 17, 2016, The DAO’s code was “exploited” by an unknown
individual. This exploit used unintended behavior of the code’s
logic to rapidly drain the fund of millions of dollars’ worth of
ETH tokens. Immediately, Slock.it, the leaders of the Ethereum
platform, numerous crypto-currency exchanges, and other informal
technical leaders stepped in to stem the bleeding – shutting down
“exits” through the exchanges, and launching counter-attacks. It is
at precisely this point that we see the vision of future governance
structures break down, and devolve into traditional models of
sociality – using existing strong ties to negotiate and influence, argue
and disagree – all with nary a line of code in sight. In the end, the
whole project was disbanded, with an inglorious “hard fork” rolling
back the ostensibly “immutable” ledger (DuPont, 2017, p. 158).
While DuPont describes The DAO experiment ultimately
as a failure, it does illustrate our perspective on decentralized
network governance. Actors on different levels of the blockchain
solution were able to exert different governance roles successfully.
This took place inside the DAO and, on a higher level on
the Ethereum network, through a “hard fork.” As such, this
DAO hack exemplifies the fact that blockchain does impose
specific governance elements by virtue of its on-chain governance
structures. In its ideal form, blockchain can resemble a liberal
notion of a positivist legal order. In times of crises, as the
DAO hack certainly represents, governance structures resorting
to off-chain solutions might more closely resemble political
governance outside of the legal order that the blockchain itself
represents (Reijers et al., 2018). However, the off-chain solution
is also a governance structure that is based on the design of the
blockchain and thus represents a meta-governance structure. In
the example of The DAO, as well as in other cases of consensus-
finding for a hard fork, actors decide on changing the rules
on a meso-level, i.e., off-chain but bound by the design of
the technology for their range of possible actions. On a meta-
level, namely, the technological infrastructure, the possibility
of this decision to hard-fork is implied by the design of the
blockchain technology. Were the technology designed in a way
that would preclude the option of a hard fork, stakeholders
would not even be able to contemplate the hard fork as an
option. This is also an example of how technology tacitly
imposes norms of governance, and how on-chain and off-chain
governance are entangled together. It also shows that governance
mechanisms of DLT are design features rather than sine qua
non-conditions.
Therefore, as illustrated above, off-chain mechanisms that
distribute tasks and obligations are typical for this sort of
governance imposed by digital networks. This characteristic is
independent of the identity of an actor. But it depends on the
specific type of power of an actor and its role in a specific
policy domain. Decentralized network governance, thus, does not
presuppose a certain delineation between actors as pre-given, but
assumes that actors’ rights, obligations, and regulatory authorities
change depending on the function and role they assume in
relation to other actors. The two most crucial new forms of power
are the power to constitute and reprogram networks (network-
making power) and the power to connect and ensure cooperation
within networks (networked power) (Castells, 2011). These two
powers are exerted by new private actors within the digital
domain of blockchain-based solutions. Within the case of The
DAO project, examples of these new actors are as follows: Slock.it,
the leaders of the Ethereum platform, numerous crypto-currency
exchanges, and other informal technical leaders.
Since the crucial elements of network power reside with
private (corporate) actors, it is important to integrate third
parties into the theoretical model of decentralized network
governance. For instance, governance roles on the blockchain
(on-chain governance) or outside and around a blockchain
solution (off-chain governance), can be performed by a myriad
of different actors. These take on a specific role in concrete
situations. Effective governance of power relationships thus
requires alliances to be brokered between actors in order to
match the exerted power of the dominant or deviant actors. This
necessitates new associations in specific and single-issue areas, in
order to establish a new and more equal balance of power. In
other words, a pre-legal political realm is given space within the
network of actors that surrounds DLT solutions. Third parties can
play governance roles via education and providing information,
acting as watchdogs and private enforcers, aiming to prevent
harm and reforming legal rules. This resembles the structures
of Mode 2 governance. The difference, however, is that these
governance tasks can be performed in alliances vis-à-vis an actor
who exerts greatest power; i.e., governance with, alongside, and
against states and legal rules.
The actors who regulate, make, have to adhere to, and are
regulated by policies vary in a fluid way. Even if the state does
not have much on-chain power as the governing actor in Mode
3, off-chain, it can play a more crucial role in empowering
different actors by enabling the clustering of interest groups.
This implies that within decentralized network governance, roles
are empowered through relationships rather than by specific
identities or policy areas. States can empower actors by providing
access to information, improving the legal standing of non-state
actors, and (in particular) raising the position of those who
represent minorities or subordinate groups vis-à-vis increasingly
powerful actors. Furthermore, due to its centralized position,
the state can assume brokerage positions and close structural
holes. Mode 3 governance also empowers individuals to enter
into new relationships outside of the traditional modes of
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governance. Examples of this are digital pressure groups, who
often supersede national borders, jurisdictions, and governance
institutions. Through the use of social networks and other
technological instruments, these interest groups voice concern,
empower others, enforce and protect rights, reform law, and
prevent harm by pressuring others to perform their obligations
adequately. Logically, three strategies of decentralized network
governance can be conceptualized:
(1) Platform strategy, in which crowds, e.g., interest groups
or one-issue parties, are enabled by the state (off-chain)
to critique and protest about powerful actors within
the network (on-chain). In this role, the state can also
facilitate the education of under-informed individuals
and institutions.
(2) Private strategy, in which crowds cooperate within a
network to achieve certain goals, put certain proposals
forward, or correct and counterbalance other power
brokers in the network.
(3) Legal strategy, in which the state or the designer of
a technology, e.g., the DAO with regard to blockchain
technologies, enables actors to effectively protest against
and critique powerful actors. This is done by exempting
them from legal requirements when there are grave power
imbalances in specific relationships.
The common effect of these strategies is that they enable
deliberation among the relevant actors and allow weaker actors
to join forces to counterbalance more powerful ones. In a
context where traditional governance fails, decentralized network
governance opens up a space for contestation in which actors
in concert govern each other. The available means range
from educational pursuits to legalizing otherwise illegal means
such as white-hat hacking or other forms of protest. Such
governance has the best chances to achieve effective regulation
of power relationships and can trigger increased and better
self-regulation. This can be done, for instance, by motivating
powerful actors to initiate more detailed codes of conduct in
concert with societal actors, or by improving international public
collaboration regarding the protections of rights for weaker
parties in the digital domain.
METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
In decentralized networked governance, actors within policy
networks engage in a networked structure rather than a
hierarchical or horizontal structure. The term “decentralized
network governance,” therefore, as foreshadowed with Castells’s
approach, is not only a descriptor of the changes in the structures
that we have witnessed in the ongoing trend from Mode 1
to Mode 3. We use this term also as a signifier to indicate
that network theory could provide a valuable analytical and
practical approach. In the following paragraphs, we will briefly
outline the implications of adapting social network theory and
methods to this domain.
As suggested for the practice of policy-making, programming,
and project design, social network analysis can provide many
insights. More can be understood about patterns of interaction,
structural holes, diffusion of information, clusters and groups
within a network, cooperation and conflict among actors, and
the effects that the emergence of new actors, as well as the
disappearance of existing actors has on a network (Zwitter,
2016). Approaching decentralized network governance from
the perspective of social network theory becomes particularly
compelling in analogy to the ideas underpinning social networks,
as formulated by Simmel (2011, p. 4):
A collection of human beings does not become a society because each
of them has an objectively determined or subjectively impelling life-
content. It becomes a society only when the vitality of these contents
attains the form of reciprocal influence; only when one individual
has an effect, immediate or mediate, upon another, is mere spatial
aggregation or temporal succession transformed into society.
Exactly this kind of vitality and reciprocal influence can
be witnessed in off-chain governance, which lends a political
dynamic. Likewise, a network of actors does not become a
governance-relevant policy network because of their individual
salient positions, but because of their interactions, the identity
they portray in specific policy circles, and the respective leverage
they have vis-à-vis other actors, depending on the subject matter.
Translating this to the case of off-chain governance, we have seen
in The DAO case that roles of actors changed from beneficiary to
regulator when moving from on-chain to off-chain governance.
Through the lens of social network analysis, the role and
power of actors within a decentralized network are functions
dependent on whether actors can influence other actors or
whether they can leverage their positions through different
forms of brokerage. The nodes (actors) and ties (connections)
ultimately determine policy-making power. Identity and role
are isolated; permanent aspects of power are irrelevant in this
context. For analytic purposes, the digital network represents “a
specific set of linkages among a defined set of persons [actors],
with the additional property that the characteristics of these
linkages as a whole may be used to interpret the social behavior
of the persons involved” (Mitchell, 1969, p. 2). That means, on
the one hand, that understanding the properties of a digital
network has analytic benefits for understanding the underlying
patterns of social structure and for explaining behavior and power
(Wellman, 1988).
On the other hand, however, it also has policy-making
implications. Understanding the power relationships that emerge
from a network structure helps in assigning responsibilities to key
players and developing appropriate governance mechanisms. As
a first step toward the analysis and structuring of a network, such
as actors in a blockchain network, power needs to be understood
differently. In network theory, power is considered as the ability
to leverage one’s position vis-à-vis ties with other actors. Power
becomes a function of centrality. It suffices to say that different
forms of centrality (degree, closeness, and betweenness centrality)
provide different methods of analysis of the network (Knoke
and Yang, 2008). Different centrality functions help to identify
the right actors, which can leverage their position adequately.
Within decentralized network governance, the centrality of
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actors is the relevant aspect of power relationships in assigning
responsibilities and developing governance mechanisms.
Of particular utility for decentralized network governance is
the clustering coefficient. Defined in social network theory, this
measure concerns the degree to which actors in a social or policy
network cluster together. It is based on the empirical finding
that, in social networks, members of distinct groups share a more
tight-knit network among each other. Within a network, distinct
groups are thus characterized by a high density of ties among a set
of nodes. The clustering coefficient can be used to identify groups
within a larger digital network that were previously unknown and
that might either leverage their coordinated power vis-à-vis the
rest of the network, or provide specific services. For example:
“Core Ethereum developers were in favor for such a hard-fork
in order to return stolen funds. Most miners followed their lead.
However, a minority of miners rejected the controversial idea
to change immutable transactions and continued mining the old
blockchain. This divided Ethereum into two co-existing blockchains,
the new one, Ethereum (ETH), and the old one, Ethereum Classic
(ETC).” (Friebe, 2017)
This illustrates that while technically everybody has an
independent vote, the leverage of prestige and networking power
(see Castells’s classification above) can determine the outcome
of off-chain voting and have direct on-chain effects as the
split into two Ethereum blockchains illustrates. At the same
time, increasingly larger mining pools are being established in
order to share processing power and, thus, the mined benefits.
Furthermore, we are increasingly witnessing single private-sector
actors establishing themselves in various blockchain domains
by using large server farms, in order to maximize profit. These
developments indicate that centralization and clustering are
taking place, which requires further analysis and potentially
governance mechanisms to regulate their effect.
In addition to the three strategies of decentralized network
governance mentioned in the previous section, the brokerage
positions within policy networks in particular can be leveraged to
achieve desired outcomes or to avoid undesired ones. Brokerage
positions appear when we have a look at different groups in
the policy network. According to Gould and Fernandez (1989),
actors can:
(1) coordinate within a group (coordinator),
(2) consult members of a group as an outsider (consultant),
(3) prevent or facilitate outsiders to gain access to a group
(gatekeeper),
(4) represent the group to the outside (representative), or
(5) mediate between separate groups (liaison).
As illustrated above, network theory and its methodical
application through social network analysis can, thus, provide
concrete insights into existing blockchain and DLT applications.
This methodology can be applied to both on-chain and off-
chain dynamics. It can also be used to design smarter digital
networks and assign roles to actors depending on their centrality
and brokerage positions, as well as identify groups within
a larger network that can fulfill certain functions (such as
counterbalancing powerful single actors). Methodologically,
social network analysis might have a central role to play in
the further development of a theoretical framework regarding
decentralized network governance. Ultimately, this may help
contribute toward the effective governance of the digital domain.
CONCLUSION
Over the years, governance mechanisms have adapted due to
globalization, increased technical specialization, and functional
differentiation. However, governance also needs to adapt to
the technical innovations of the digital domain in general, and
to the increasing use of blockchain technology in particular.
Due to the use of and reliance on digital networks, DLT and
blockchain technology are increasingly shaping our societies and
power relationships. Even at a time when their full potential is
still debated and undetermined, the effects of technologies as
governance instruments are increasingly tangible. In the present
article, we have provided the first systematic steps toward the
necessary reconceptualization of governance as applicable to
societies increasingly shaped by digital networks and blockchain
technology. We have proposed a framework of decentralized
network governance. As illustrated in this paper with cases from
blockchain technology, decentralized network governance is by
no means limited to DLT. It applies equally to all modern
power relationships that are characterized by the preponderance
of private actors that provide networks of communication for
other private actors.
In order to set the stage and explain the necessity of a
reconceptualization of governance, we started by outlining the
FIGURE 4 | Overview of modes of governance.
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transformative nature of blockchain technology as a case within
and representative of the larger implications of the changes
experienced in the digital and online domain. It became
apparent that DLT has concrete, disruptive effects on policy-
making when examining the impact on existing actors and
the emergence of new ones. Furthermore, for the purpose of
developing a stringent framework for decentralized network
governance, old (Mode 1) and new (Mode 2) governance
were analyzed, focusing on power, identity, and the roles that
actors play within these forms of governance. Mode 1 describes
traditional, hierarchical governance with fixed identities (states,
corporations, and citizens). Mode 2 describes a more horizontal
form of governance with fixed roles depending on power and
expertise (see Figure 4). Within Mode 2 governance, one
can identify three forms: (a) public–private governance, (b)
non-autonomous self-governance, and (c) autonomous self-
governance.
To illustrate this, we took blockchain technologies and DAOs
specifically as examples. We concluded that these examples are
inaccessible to both traditional forms of governance. The core
critique is that both modes of governance do not take into
account the fact that the roles of actors in DLT-based solutions
are constantly changing, and that power is context-specific and
relational. This became apparent in the off-chain solution sought
to remedy the DAO hack. In order to capture this new form
of governance, which is also applicable in all sorts of digital
networks, we propose the concept of decentralized network
governance. This new mode of governance is characterized by
the changing and multiple roles of actors, and the necessity
to identify roles depending on network clusters and policy
domains. This new perspective on governance as networked
but decentralized opens up new policy mechanisms such as
the design of new platforms for counterbalancing emergent
digital actors. Network-making power facilitates the provision
of such platforms for interest groups, tech-brokers, and private
citizens, as well as actors with weaker power. Whereas on-
chain governance can impose a mode of governance explicitly,
off-chain governance can assume such governance structures
tacitly. This governance structure in technology networks
displays the fluid features that characterize decentralized
network governance.
It would have gone beyond the scope of this article to
further unearth empirical material in the blockchain domain to
flesh out the theoretical framework presented here. Therefore,
it would be worthwhile to further investigate whether the
interaction between on-chain and off-chain governance does
indeed lead to specific governance dynamics. If the future of
governance is indeed one of changing roles and power alliances,
we should expect to see increasingly fluid dynamics within and
surrounding digital networks. Such fluidity could express itself
merely as users of the network banding together and increasingly
defining the network. It could, however, also take explicit forms
of governance within set rules of the network. This would
depend on whether the network allowed for such decisions
itself (e.g., on-chain) or whether it required extraordinary
measures to be taken outside the network (e.g., off-chain, or
alternative platforms).
Hence, decentralized network governance, as a new Mode 3
governance, allows for the conceptualization of new forms of
regulation of digitalized social affairs. This is illustrated by the
multiple uses of blockchain for logistic, financial or contractual
purposes, which acknowledge the fluidity of roles of actors in
and around blockchain networks. It recognizes that traditional
means of command-and-control governance have little use
concerning radically democratized platforms. This conception of
a third form of decentralized, yet networked, governance gives
concrete indications of the utility of social network analysis with
regard to policy-making and the design of governance tools in
the digital domain.
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